Augustine of Hippo · On the Proceedings of Pelagius
Book II · Chapter 20 — The Same Continued. Pelagius Acknowledges the Doctrine of
There can be no doubt that what Pelagius has acknowledged as his own is as yet very obscure. I suppose, however, that it will become apparent in the subsequent details of these proceedings. Now he says: "We have affirmed that a man is able to be without sin, and to keep the commandments of God if he wishes, inasmuch as God has given him this ability. But we have not said that any man can be found, who from infancy to old age has never committed sin; but that if any person were converted from his sins, he could by his own exertion and God's grace be without sin; and yet not even thus would he be incapable of change afterwards." Now it is quite uncertain what he means in these words by the grace of God; and the judges, catholic as they were, could not possibly understand by the phrase anything else than the grace which is so very strongly recommended to us in the apostle's teaching. Now this is the grace whereby we hope that we can be delivered from the body of this death through our Lord Jesus Christ, [VII.] and for the obtaining of which we pray that we may not be led into temptation. This grace is not nature, but that which renders assistance to frail and corrupted nature. This grace is not the knowledge of the law, but is that of which the apostle says: "I will not make void the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." Therefore it is not "the letter that killeth, but the life-giving spirit." For the knowledge of the law, without the grace of the Spirit, produces all kinds of concupiscence in man; for, as the apostle says, "I had not known sin but by the law: I had not known lust, unless the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence." By saying this, however, he blames not the law; he rather praises it, for he says afterwards: "The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." And he goes on to ask: "Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, wrought death in me by that which is good." And, again, he praises the law by saying: "We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I know not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good." Observe, then, he knows the law, praises it, and consents to it; for what it commands, that he also wishes; and what it forbids, and condemns, that he also hates: but for all that, what he hates, that he actually does. There is in his mind, therefore, a knowledge of the holy law of God, but still his evil concupiscence is not cured. He has a good will within him, but still what he does is evil. Hence it comes to pass that, amidst the mutual struggles of the two laws within him,--"the law in his members warring against the law of his mind, and making him captive to the law of sin," --he confesses his misery; and exclaims in such words as these: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord."
Chapter 21 [VIII.]--The Same Continued.
It is not nature, therefore, which, sold as it is under sin and wounded by the offence, longs for a Redeemer and Saviour; nor is it the knowledge of the law--through which comes the discovery, not the expulsion, of sin--which delivers us from the body of this death; but it is the Lord's good grace through our Lord Jesus Christ.
Chapter 21 [IX.]--The Same Continued.
This grace is not dying nature, nor the slaying letter, but the vivifying spirit; for already did he possess nature with freedom of will, because he said: "To will is present with me." Nature, however, in a healthy condition and without a flaw, he did not possess, for he said: "I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth nothing good." Already had he the knowledge of God's holy law, for he said: "I had not known sin but through the law;" yet for all that, he did not possess strength and power to practise and fulfil righteousness, for he complained: "What I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I." And again, "How to accomplish that which is good I find not." Therefore it is not from the liberty of the human will, nor from the precepts of the law, that there comes deliverance from the body of this death; for both of these he had already,--the one in his nature, the other in his learning; but all he wanted was the help of the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.
Chapter 22 [X.]--The Same Continued. The Synod Supposed that the Grace Acknowledged by Pelagius Was that Which Was So Thoroughly Known to the Church.
This grace, then, which was most completely known in the catholic Church (as the bishops were well aware), they supposed Pelagius made confession of, when they heard him say that "a man, when converted from his sins, is able by his own exertion and the grace of God to be without sin." For my own part, however, I remembered the treatise which had been given to me, that I might refute it, by those servants of God, who had been Pelagius' followers. They, notwithstanding their great affection for him, plainly acknowledged that the passage was his; when, on this question being proposed, because he had already given offence to very many persons from advancing views against the grace of God, he most expressly admitted that "what he meant by God's grace was that, when our nature was created, it received the capacity of not sinning, because it was created with free will." On account, therefore, of this treatise, I cannot help feeling still anxious, whilst many of the brethren who are well acquainted with his discussions, share in my anxiety, lest under the ambiguity which notoriously characterizes his words there lies some latent reserve, and lest he should afterwards tell his followers that it was without prejudice to his own doctrine that he made any admissions,--discoursing thus: "I no doubt asserted that a man was able by his own exertion and the grace of God to live without sin; but you know very well what I mean by grace; and you may recollect reading that grace is that in which we are created by God with a free will." Accordingly, while the bishops understood him to mean the grace by which we have by adoption been made new creatures, not that by which we were created (for most plainly does Holy Scripture instruct us in the former sense of grace as the true one), ignorant of his being a heretic, they acquitted him as a catholic. I must say that my suspicion is excited also by this, that in the work which I answered, he most openly said that "righteous Abel never sinned at all." Now, however, he thus expresses himself: "But we did not say that any man could be found who at no time whatever, from infancy to old age, has committed sin; but that, if any man were converted from his sins, he could by his own labour and God's grace be without sin." When speaking of righteous Abel, he did not say that after being converted from his sins he became sinless in a new life, but that he never committed sin at all. If, then, that book be his, it must of course be corrected and amended from his answer. For I should be sorry to say that he was insincere in his more recent statement; lest perhaps he should say that he had forgotten what he had previously written in the book we have quoted. Let us therefore direct our view to what afterwards occurred. Now, from the sequel of these ecclesiastical proceedings, we can by God's help show that, although Pelagius, as some suppose, cleared himself in his examination, and was at all events acquitted by his judges (who were, however, but human beings after all), that this great heresy, which we should be most unwilling to see making further progress or becoming aggravated in guilt, was undoubtedly itself condemned.
Chapter 23 [XI.]--The Seventh Item of the Accusation: the Breviates of Coelestius Objected to Pelagius.
Then follow sundry statements charged against Pelagius, which are said to be found among the opinions of his disciple Coelestius: how that "Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not sinned; that Adam's sin injured only himself and not the human race; that the law no less than the gospel leads us to the kingdom; that there were sinless men previous to the coming of Christ; that new-born infants are in the same condition as Adam was before the fall; that the whole human race does not, on the one hand, die through Adam's death or transgression, nor, on the other hand, does the whole human race rise again through the resurrection of Christ." These have been so objected to, that they are even said to have been, after a full hearing, condemned at Carthage by your holiness and other bishops associated with you. I was not present on that occasion, as you will recollect; but afterwards, on my arrival at Carthage, I read over the Acts of the synod, some of which I perfectly well remember, but I do not know whether all the tenets now mentioned occur among them. But what matters it if some of them were possibly not mentioned, and so not included in the condemnation of the synod when it is quite clear that they deserve condemnation? Sundry other points of error were next alleged against him, connected with the mention of my own name. They had been transmitted to me from Sicily, some of our Catholic brethren there being perplexed by questions of this kind; and I drew up a reply to them in a little work addressed to Hilary, who had consulted me respecting them in a letter. My answer, in my opinion, was a sufficient one. These are the errors referred to: "That a man is able to be without sin if he wishes. That infants, even if they die unbaptized, have eternal life. That rich men, even if they are baptized, unless they renounce all, have, whatever good they may seem to have done, nothing of it reckoned to them; neither can they possess the kingdom of God."
Notes
- 1655. Rom. vii. 24, 25.
- 1656. Matt. vi. 13.
- 1657. Gal. ii. 21.
- 1658. 2 Cor. iii. 6.
- 1659. Rom. vii. 7, 8.
- 1660. Rom. vii. 12.
- 1661. Rom. vii. 13.
- 1662. Rom. vii. 14-16.
- 1663. Rom. vii. 23.
- 1664. Rom. vii. 24, 25.
- 1665. Rom. vii. 25.
- 1666. Rom. vii. 18.
- 1667. Rom. vii. 18.
- 1668. Rom. vii. 7.
- 1669. Rom. vii. 15.
- 1670. Rom. vii. 18.
- 1671. Timasius and Jacobus, at whose instance Augustin wrote, and to whom he addressed his book De Naturâ et Gratiâ.
- 1672. The reader may consult the treatise De Naturâ et Gratiâ, chs. 53 and 54, on this opinion of Pelagius.
- 1673. See De Naturâ et Gratiâ, xxxvii. (44).
- 1674. See above, ch. 16 (vi).
- 1675. Hanc talem hæresim.
- 1676. Compare Augustin's work De Peccato Originali, ch. xi. (12).
- 1677. See same treatise as before, and same chapter.
- 1678. See Augustin's letter to Hilary, in Epist 157.